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Abstract
This paper examines the role of the ¯nancial sector in renewable energy
(RE) development. Although RE can bring socio-economic and environ-
mental bene¯ts, its implementation faces a number of obstacles, especially
in non-OECD countries. One of these obstacles is ¯nancing: underdevel-
oped ¯nancial sectors are unable to e±ciently channel loans to RE produc-
ers. The in°uence of ¯nancial sector development on the use of renewable
energy resources is con¯rmed in panel data estimations on up to 119 non-
OECD countries for 1980-2006. Financial intermediation, in particular
commercial banking, has a signi¯cant positive e®ect on the amount of
RE produced, and the impact is especially large when we consider non-
hydropower RE such as wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass. There is
also evidence that the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol has had a signi¯cant
positive impact on the development of the RE sector.
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Achieving a diversi¯ed and sustainable energy supply for future generations is
one of the major challenges for today's policymakers. Global energy demand is
projected to grow by around 45 percent by 2030: more than three-quarters of
the increased demand will come from developing and transition countries (IEA,
2008). Energy demand will continue to be covered mainly by conventional fossil
fuels, such as coal, oil, and natural gas; accordingly, energy-related pollution is
predicted to increase by up to 45 percent. Although OECD countries will still
be major polluters, 97 percent of the estimated increase will come from non-
OECD countries, especially China, India, and the Middle East (ibid.). Mean-
while, many estimates predict that oil and possibly natural gas production will
plateau around the same time, casting doubt on future energy security.1 Hence,
achieving a sustainable energy supply requires diversifying energy sources and
changing the current dependence on non-renewable and polluting hydrocarbon
fuels, a fact which is likely to feature prominently at the 2009 Climate Confer-
ence in Copenhagen. For example, in a recent report the UN Commission on
Sustainable Development states:
\Energy is crucial for sustainable development, poverty eradication
and achieving the internationally agreed development goals, includ-
ing the Millennium Development Goals. [...] Access to reliable,
a®ordable, economically viable, socially acceptable and environ-
mentally sound energy services is crucial, particularly in developing
countries. [...] While fossil fuels will continue to play an important
role in the energy supply in the decades to come, every e®ort must
be made to diversify the energy mix" (UN, 2007: 15).
Renewable energy technologies (RETs) can bring about both environmental
and socio-economic bene¯ts.2 They generally entail fewer emissions, use local
resources|including labour|foster basic electri¯cation in developing countries,
and increase energy security.3 However, although there are already several com-
mercially available and economically attractive RETs, they still account for only
1The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2000) alone has published several dif-
ferent scenarios, with global oil production peaking between 2021 and 2112. In its latest World
Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency (IEA) states that global oil production is
not expected to peak before 2030 (IEA, 2008). Note however that there is also some skepticism
regarding the peak oil scenarios. For a discussion of peak oil, see for example De®eyes (2005).
2RETs include both the more traditional hydropower technologies, as well as newer tech-
nologies that harness wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal power. Most recently, the use of
biofuels and their negative impact on food production, for example in Brazil, has called into
question the wisdom of promoting (all types of) RETs. In our investigation, we concentrate
on electricity generation, where wood and waste are the only types of biomass considered and
biofuels therefore play no role.
3The United Nations Environmental Programme's Global Green New Deal report presents
a more extensive discussion of the short- to long-term environmental, social and economic
2a modest proportion of global energy generation. This fact suggests that there
are some missing links between the potential of RETs and their implementation.
One problem regards the institutional framework and the absence of a policy
design to e®ectively foster RETs. In this paper, we focus on another important
missing link: the ¯nancing of renewable energy (RE) projects, in particular the
relationship between ¯nancial sector and RET development in transition and
developing countries.4 This missing link has been pointed out by numerous
practitioners, who see the absence of well-developed ¯nancial intermediaries
and the consequent ¯nancing di±culties as one of the most important obstacles
during the realization of RE projects in developing countries (e.g., Painuly and
Wohlgemuth, 2006).
Energy projects generally demand high levels of ¯nancing, which producers
in less developed economies in particular can rarely cover on their own (World
Bank, 1999; IEA, 2003). In turn, the ¯nancing for RETs is closely connected
to the development of the ¯nancial sector. On the one hand, energy sector
privatisation and liberalisation during the course of the 1990s increased the
contribution of smaller private power projects, and at the same time induced
a shift in external ¯nancing from the local government and multilateral insti-
tutions to private investors (Babbar and Schuster, 1998; Tharakan et al., 2007;
Tirpak and Adams, 2008). On the other hand, RE projects have very high
start-up costs relative to the expected monetary returns, and lengthy payback
periods: they therefore typically require long-term maturity loans (UNEP FI,
2004; Sonntag-O'Brien and Usher, 2004b). The result was a plunge in energy
project investment in the mid-1990s as large bilateral and multilateral donors
pulled out, and investment in this sector has struggled to take o® again.
The problem of ¯nancing RE projects is twofold: ¯rst, RET ¯rms generally
need long-term loans, whose availability in turn is positively linked to the devel-
opment of the banking system (DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). In less
bene¯ts of RETs not only for developed, but also for developing countries (Barbier, 2009).
Among the e®ects mentioned is also a positive local employment e®ect: for example, in China
the RE sector already o®ers nearly 1 million jobs, while in India, the wind energy sector alone
employs around 10 thousand people (see also Renner et al., 2008)
4Missing ¯nance is obviously connected to the more general policy framework for RETs: as
previous literature has pointed out, limited ¯nancing of RETs derives not only from underde-
veloped ¯nancial intermediators, but also from the lack of a speci¯c policy design, and/or
crowding-out e®ects from government policies favouring investment in fossil fuel projects
(Churchill and Saunders, 1989; Wohlgemuth and Painuly, 1999; Head, 2000; World Bank,
2002; Sonntag-O'Brien and Usher, 2004b; UNEP FI, 2004). Institutional shortcomings also
contribute to the often limited consideration by potential investors of the positive environ-
mental externalities of RETs in project development costs. In general, the perception that
energy sustainability is not a top priority for policymakers further lowers investors' willingness
to ¯nance projects where the foreseeable rewards are already relatively low and long in the
coming (see Williams and Ghanadan, 2006 for a useful survey of electricity reform policies
in developing and transition countries). We take the policy framework into account in our
estimations to isolate the speci¯c e®ect of ¯nancial sector development (see Section 2).
3developed economies, the banking sector is the major source of external ¯nanc-
ing (Tadesse, 2002; Carlin and Mayer, 2003; and Beck et al., 2004a), and access
to bank credit is a serious problem especially for small- and medium-sized com-
panies (Beck et al., 2004b). As a consequence, RE projects in less developed
countries are at a particular disadvantage. Second, RET ¯rms have limited
access to ¯nancing because RE projects compete against fossil fuel projects,
which have a longer track record, relatively lower up-front costs, shorter lead
times, and often favourable political treatment (Churchill and Saunders, 1989;
Head, 2000; World Bank, 2002; Sonntag-O'Brien and Usher, 2004b).
It is worth noting that in both cases, under-investment in RET ¯rms can
be interpreted in terms of imperfect information between ¯rms and ¯nanciers:
projects aimed at developing new technologies bear, almost by de¯nition, greater
information costs to investors, which are more easily borne by a highly devel-
oped ¯nancial sector. Where the latter is not given, the result may well be a
market distortion in favour of less risky investments, such as fossil fuel projects
and large-sized enterprises. This is consistent with the view that the develop-
ment of the domestic ¯nancial sector is a crucial factor in meeting the booming
energy demand in less developed economies (Ishiguro and Akiyama, 1995; World
Bank, 2003).
Renewable energy adoption is one of the targets of the Kyoto Protocol.
There are two mechanisms in particular which can potentially help to over-
come the ¯nancing hurdle, namely the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
and the Joint Implementation (JI) programme. Both are designed to help Ky-
oto Protocol member countries|in particular Annex B countries| meet their
emission targets, and to encourage the private sector to contribute to emission
reduction e®orts (see e.g., Pacudan 2005). The CDM mechanism in particu-
lar has been quite popular since its inception in 2006, with more than 1000
projects already approved. It is the only Kyoto Protocol mechanism which
includes developing countries: it allows Annex B countries that are subject
to emission-reduction targets to implement emission-reduction projects in non-
Annex B developing countries, and earn certi¯ed emission reduction credits (JI
programmes on the other hand involve joint projects by two Annex B coun-
tries). Some RE projects were already initiated in the late 1990s as CDM or
JI pilot programmes, such as the Tejona windfarm in Costa Rica.5 The Kyoto
5The Tejona windfarm also illustrates the importance of an adequate ¯nancing framework.
The project's history dates back to the 1970s, when the Costa Rican government applied to
the regional Development Bank and the World Bank for ¯nancing assistance. A feasibility
study followed in 1993, and a private wind energy company sought to develop the windfarm as
an independent power project. However, it took until 1998 to ¯nd a project ¯nancing model,
which ended up being a build-operate-lease construction together with a Dutch consortium,
with the support of the Dutch government and the coordination of the Global Environment
Facility. In the meantime, the Costa Rican Electricity Institute had decided to develop the
site as a public sector project. The windfarm is now operational and has a capacity of 20MW.
Several private wind farm developers are negotiating project ¯nance arrangements for new
4Protocol's adoption in December 1997 obviously marks a major change in global
climate policy: we incorporate the potential \Kyoto e®ects" into our study to
further isolate the impact of ¯nancial sector development on the RE sector.
However, it is still too early to gauge the full impact of the new Kyoto ¯nanc-
ing possibilities on the adoption of RE in developing and transition countries;
this question is therefore left to future research.6
The analysis of the role of the ¯nancial sector|commercial banking, ¯nan-
cial markets, insurance, etc.|for economic performance has generated a vast
literature during the past two decades (see for example DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and
Levine, 2001 for an overview). The importance of the (private) ¯nancial sector
particularly for the development of the energy sector has also been pointed out
in several studies. In one of the earliest analyses of energy sector ¯nancing
in developing countries, Churchill and Saunders (1989) discuss a proper policy
framework to encourage private sector ¯nancial involvement. Ten years later,
Babbar and Schuster (1998) and Head (2000) still ¯nd substantial gaps in the
¯nancing of power projects, particularly RE projects. The ¯nancing obstacles
for RETs are con¯rmed in the overview by Wohlgemuth and Painuly (1999),
where e®orts in di®erent countries and regions are discussed and several policy
recommendations derived. More recently, Sonntag-O'Brien and Usher (2004a)
and Painuly and Wohlgemuth (2006) take a look at the experience to date with
RET implementation in developing and transition countries, and again point to
the (private sector) ¯nancing problems that RE projects encounter, as well as
to some successful models that have been adopted. MacLean and Siegel (2007)
concentrate on the ¯nancing of small-scale RE projects and distinguish three
¯nancing areas: end-user ¯nance, business ¯nance, and small-scale project ¯-
nance. The need for well-informed (local) commercial ¯nanciers, often to act
as ¯nancing partners for the government and/or international development or-
ganizations, is a recurrent theme in all three areas.7
Despite the importance of the ¯nancial sector for the development of RETs
particularly in developing and transition countries, which is borne out by nu-
merous case study and anecdotal evidence, the subject has received little aca-
wind power developments under power purchase agreements with the Electricity Institute
(see van Hulle et al., 2003).
6See for example Huang and Barker (2009) for a study on the e®ects to date of the CDM
mechanism on CO2 emissions.
7Among the examples cited in the report is that of a small hydro project on the West Nile in
Uganda. The project was realized thanks to a loan from a commercial lender, Barclays, which
has a strong presence in Africa. \Given their lack of experience with this type of project and
other ¯nancial market conditions", Barclays was however only willing to extend a seven-year
loan (MacLean and Siegel 2007: 71). In order to make the project a®ordable, the World Bank
provided a partial guarantee, which extended the loan term to 14 years. Note that since that
initial experience, Barclays has ¯nanced similar projects in Africa, including another small
hydro plant in Kenya, and|together with a South African bank|a 250MW hydro-electric
station, again on the Nile river in Uganda.
5demic research attention. This paper contributes to the knowledge on what
determines RET implementation by empirically analysing the relationship be-
tween ¯nancial intermediation and RE sector development, with a focus on
non-OECD countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst attempt to
examine this issue in a systematic empirical analysis.8
The literature discussed above suggests that a more highly-developed ¯nan-
cial sector will have a positive impact on the development of the renewable
energy sector. A well-functioning and unrestricted banking sector should be
particularly relevant for credit allocation to renewable energy companies in
developing and transition countries, where ¯nancial markets are still relatively
small and bond or equity ¯nancing is therefore di±cult or impossible. Of course,
a well-developed ¯nancial sector alone is no guarantee for the success of RETs:
the availability of adequate ¯nancing mechanisms should be viewed in the wider
context of an appropriate RE policy framework.
We propose an empirical framework to test the e®ect of ¯nancial sector de-
velopment on RETs. We construct a panel dataset for up to 119 non-OECD
countries for the period 1980-2006, using electricity generation per capita from
renewable energy technologies as a proxy for RE sector development. We isolate
the ¯nancial sector e®ects by controlling for energy-relevant policy measures,
as well as measures of more general institutional quality. The empirical results
from generalised least squares (GLS) panel and dynamic Arellano-Bond Gen-
eralised Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimations con¯rm the positive e®ect of
¯nancial sector and especially commercial banking sector development on RET
use in developing and transition countries. The e®ects are particularly strong
and economically signi¯cant for the newer RETs, including wind, solar, geother-
mal and biomass, while the overall impact on RE and hydropower generation
is much more limited in magnitude, though still statistically signi¯cant.
The results also suggest that the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol has had
a strong positive e®ect on the di®usion of RETs throughout developing and
transition countries. The ¯ndings are robust to the inclusion of other covariates
which could in°uence RE sector development, such as oil, coal and natural gas
production and prices, and proxies for RE potential. The implication is that
without proper (private sector) ¯nance, renewable energy is unlikely to reach
its full potential in the developing world. An adequate ¯nancing framework
should therefore be part of a more general RE sector development policy.
The paper is organised as follows. The data and empirical methodology are
described in Section (2), while the results are presented in Section (3). Section
(4) concludes with a brief summary and discussion.
8The theoretical contributions on this topic are equally scarce: one attempt to model
the connections between ¯nance and RE sector development is presented in Brunnschweiler
(2006).
62 Data and methodology
The discussion of the role of commercial ¯nance in the development of RE has
so far been based mainly on case studies and anecdotal evidence. The lack
of a more systematic empirical analysis of the correlation between ¯nancial
sector and RE development, independent of (or in addition to) a speci¯c RE
policy framework, has probably also been due to the data problem regarding
the quanti¯cation of the RE sector, especially in the developing world.
The obstacles begin with the de¯nition of RE in o±cial statistics: tradi-
tionally, hydropower|mostly provided by large plants|has delivered the lion's
share of renewable energy in countries' energy generation mix, with other types
of RE|when included|making up for barely a few percent of overall energy
production. Recently however, some environmentalists and policymakers have
contended that large hydropower projects should not be viewed as viable con-
tributions to sustainable energy production, as they often cause serious neg-
ative environmental and social externalities (notable examples are the giant
Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River in China or the Ilisu dam project
in Turkey). Moreover, most traditional, large hydro projects in the develop-
ing world have been co-¯nanced by multilateral ¯nancial institutions and the
local governments, with little or no involvement sought of commercial ¯nance
(World Bank, 2003). The use of an overall RE measure could therefore intro-
duce a downward bias into the results on the importance of the ¯nancial sector
for more modern RETs such as wind, geothermal and solar power. A further
possible issue concerns the negative impact on agricultural (food) production
of encouraging biomass production for use as biofuel, as demonstrated by the
recent large °uctuations in the prices of grains and other foodstu®s.
We consider these issues when testing the importance of ¯nancial interme-
diation for RET development. First, we distinguish between di®erent types of
renewable energy generation, in addition to the aggregate measure. Second, as
a proxy for our dependent variable, RE sector development, we use electricity
generated with renewable resources in per-capita terms, and therefore avoid the
issue of biofuels.
We construct three separate measures of RE sector development. The ¯rst,
repc, measures the overall renewable resource electricity generation|including
all types of hydropower, wood and waste, geothermal, solar, and wind|in bil-
lion kwh per capita.9 The second variable, hydropc, considers only hydroelectric
power generation, again in billion kwh per capita. This distinction takes into
account the importance of large hydropower in electricity generation, and their
possible distorting e®ect on the results found using the data on total renewable
energy generation. The third and ¯nal dependent variable, geopc, considers
9Note that the sum of components in the electricity generation data may not equal total
due to independent rounding. Detailed descriptions of all variables and their sources can be
found in the Appendix.
7electricity produced from all non-hydro renewable energy types including some
of the latest RETs, i.e. geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste energy
resources. Again, this measure is in billion kwh per capita.
The electricity generation data for all three dependent variables is freely
available from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) on a yearly
basis since 1980 (or since the early 1990s for countries of the former Soviet
Union and former Yugoslavia). The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that
the dependent variables repc and hydropc have a wide variation in per capita
renewable energy resource intensity, while the generation of non-hydro renew-
able resource electricity (geopc) is more limited. A look at the share of RE
in overall electricity generation shows that on average, in non-OECD coun-
tries around 34% of electric power was produced by renewable energy resources
between 1980-2006, compared with around 32% in OECD countries. This rela-
tively similar picture remains when we consider the share of hydroelectric power
generation in overall electricity generation, which was on average around 33%
for non-OECD and 29% for OECD countries. In both groups of countries, hy-
dropower covered from 0% right up to 100% of total electricity generation. The
situation is more varied when we look at the non-hydro RE share: in non-OECD
countries, wood, waste, wind, solar and geothermal energy produced barely 1%
of total electricity on average, but up to 40% in low- to middle-income coun-
tries like El Salvador and Nicaragua. In OECD countries, the average share of
electricity generated from non-hydro RE was 3%, reaching up to nearly 20% in
Luxembourg and 30% in Denmark.10
As noted above, the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in late 1997 marks a
huge shift in global climate policy, which also a®ects RE policy. It is therefore
interesting to examine the data for any evidence of a change in RE use since
1998. In general, there has indeed been an increase in electricity generation
with RETs in non-OECD countries: on average, overall RE electricity gener-
ation went from an average of 263.4 million kwh per capita before Kyoto to
393.8 million kwh per capita post-Kyoto. This was due to a large increase in
hydropower, but also to a near doubling of non-hydro electricity production
from an average 5 million kwh per capita to 9.6 million kwh per capita. Fur-
ther analysis reveals that the post-Kyoto increase in RE use is common for all
country income groups. It is also observable in all regions of the world, with a
particularly large jump in RE use in South-Eastern Asia: here, average overall
10In our estimations, we use the per-capita values of RE and not the share of RE in total
energy production. This avoids picking up possible spurious correlations between ¯nancial
sector development and the RE share, since total energy generation (in the denominator)
is probably highly correlated with overall economic development (including ¯nancial sector
development). To further preclude spurious results, we control for income per capita (see
below). However, the main results|in particular for the share of non-hydro RE used in power
generation|are qualitatively similar using RE shares to those found using RE per capita
(available upon request).
8RE electricity generation went from 295.8 billion kwh per capita to 507.8 billion
kwh per capita post-Kyoto. Again, most of the increase in this region comes
from more hydropower; but non-hydro electricity generation increased more
than 27-fold from a comparatively very modest 21 thousand kwh per capita
to an average 569.4 thousand kwh per capita in the period after 1998. These
initial ¯ndings are suggestive of a strong \Kyoto e®ect", which we will take into
account in the estimations below.
The main explanatory variables include three di®erent indicators of ¯nancial
sector development, and a vector of control variables. The measures of ¯nancial
sector development are taken from Beck et al. (2000). They are not direct
measures of banks' e±ciency in credit allocation, but rather di®erent proxies for
¯nancial intermediary development tested in the literature.11 The ¯rst indicator
of ¯nancial sector development, dbacba, measures the importance of commercial
banks' asset share versus that of the central bank. In more highly developed
and open economies, the commercial ¯nancial sector handles a greater share
of household savings than the central bank. Assuming that the commercial
¯nancial sector is more e±cient than the public one in allocating credits, dbacba
should positively correlate with RET development. This variable has also been
tested several times in the ¯nance literature, e.g. in King and Levine (1993a,b)
and Levine et al. (2000).
The second variable, pcrdbgdp, captures the amount of credit provided by
¯nancial institutions to the private sector as a share of GDP. It excludes cred-
its issued by governments and development banks. An unrestricted ¯nancial
sector can be expected to account for a larger share of lending to the private
sector. In fact, this variable has been shown by Levine et al. (2000) to be a
reliable measure of ¯nancial intermediary development, i.e. the ability of ¯-
nancial institutions to e±ciently mobilise and allocate resources to pro¯table
ventures. Earlier versions of the measure were used for example in King and
Levine (1993a,b) and Levine and Zervos (1998). We expect pcrdbgdp to corre-
late positively with the level of development of the RE sector.
The third and ¯nal ¯nancial variable, llgdp, is a general measure of ¯nan-
cial sector development commonly known as \¯nancial depth". It is de¯ned
as liquid liabilities of the ¯nancial system|currency plus demand and interest-
bearing liabilities of banks and other ¯nancial intermediaries or, more generally,
M2|divided by GDP. Financial depth is the broadest measure of ¯nancial inter-
11Beck et al. (2000) provide a large ¯nancial structure dataset on the World Bank website.
The data used here comes from the dataset revised on November 21, 2008. This also includes
two new variables which measure the e±ciency with which commercial banks channel funds
from savers to investors: overhead costs (i.e., the accounting value of a bank's overhead costs
as share of its total assets) and the net interest margin (i.e., the accounting value of a bank's
net interest revenue as a share of its total assets). Unfortunately however, these measures are
as yet only available since the mid-1990s for a limited number of countries. We therefore use
three more conventional measures of ¯nancial sector development.
9mediation, giving an indication of the overall size of the ¯nancial sector without
distinguishing either between commercial and non-commercial banks and other
¯nancial intermediaries, or between the use of the liabilities. The assumption is
that the relative size of the ¯nancial intermediary sector is positively correlated
with the quantity and quality of the ¯nancial services provided, and we would
therefore again expect a positive in°uence on the development of RETs.
All three ¯nancial variables are measured in current prices, and GDP is PPP
adjusted (see Beck et al. 2000 for more details). Table 1 shows that there is con-
siderable variation in the ¯nancial sector development in non-OECD countries,
ranging from practically non-existent in some countries to levels comparable
with many OECD countries.12 As is to be expected, the means of all three
indices were higher throughout the period for upper-middle-income and high-
income non-OECD countries: the average values of dbacba, pcrdbgdp and llgdp
were, respectively, 0.86, 0.39, and 0.53, as opposed to 0.67, 0.19, and 0.33 in
low- and lower-middle-income countries. These numbers also seem to indicate
that the three variables measure slightly di®erent aspects of the ¯nancial sector:
in fact, dbacba has a 0.5 correlation with pcrdbgdp and 0.39 with llgdp, while
pcrdbgdp and llgdp are more highly correlated (0.8). We will use the three
¯nancial sector variables separately to minimise multicollinearity issues.
We expect RE sector development to depend on several factors other than
¯nancial intermediation. One obvious factor is the regulatory (or policy) frame-
work for RE. We introduce two variables to capture di®erent aspects of energy
sector regulation. The ¯rst, psreform, describes the level of power sector reform,
without special reference to RETs. It is based on a broad qualitative survey by
the World Bank conducted in 1998 (ESMAP, 1999) and takes on values from
0 (least reformed) to 6 (reforms in all relevant areas have been implemented).
The evaluation considers measures to create equal market opportunities for all
energy resource types and encourage private ¯rms' participation and compe-
tition (\competition" being a main reform criterion). Hence, psreform is a
proxy for government energy policies|although unfortunately a time-invariant
proxy, since it is based on a one-time study. The ESMAP study was conducted
for a large number of developing and transition economies, but not for most
high-income and OECD countries. We assigned a value of 6 to all high-income
non-OECD economies|ten mainly small island states|and the OECD coun-
tries (used in comparison estimations). In robustness tests, we add a dummy
variable for \arti¯cially" assigned top scores, or alternatively drop these coun-
tries altogether; both methods do not alter our main results, and even reinforce
them (see below). The descriptive statistics show that power sector reforms
have a relatively low mean of 2.58.
12Note that the most highly developed OECD countries have a ¯nancial depth (llgdp) of
around 3.7, a commercial bank asset share (dbacba) of 1, and a private credit share (pcrdbgdp)
of nearly 2.8.
10The second policy measure seeks to capture more speci¯c RE policies by
looking at the e®ects of the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, which also includes
e®orts to diversify energy production to include more RETs. For this, we
construct a simple zero-one dummy variable that takes on value one for all
years from 1998 onwards.13
As discussed in the previous section, the institutional framework is also a
crucial element of ¯nanciers' information costs on RETs, signalling a govern-
ment's commitment to levelling the playing ¯eld for energy providers or even
positively encouraging RETs, thereby reducing uncertainty about future prof-
itability of a RE project. Since there is no reliable data available on creditor
evaluation costs in less developed economies, these crude policy proxies will
have to su±ce. We expect a positive impact of both power sector reforms and
the Kyoto dummy on the RE sector.
In addition to the two energy policy variables, we also use measures of over-
all institutional quality in robustness tests. It is in fact likely that RE projects,
like other types of investment projects, bene¯t from general political stability,
sound regulatory frameworks, e®ective governance, and secure property rights.
Moreover, institutional quality in general could be correlated with ¯nancial sec-
tor development in particular, although correlation coe±cients range between
a modest 0.38 and 0.5 (with the exception of pcrdbgdp, which has correlation
coe±cients between 0.52 and 0.61 with the institutional quality measures). We
consider three di®erent institutional measures: the ¯rst is an economic freedom
index compiled by Gwartney et al. (2008) on a ¯ve-yearly basis until 2000,
and on a yearly basis since 2001 (values for the most recent year were used
for intermediate years before 2000). The index ranges from 1 (worst) to 10
(best) and includes evaluations of the legal structure and security of property
rights, government size, access to sound money, trade freedom, and regulation of
credit, labour, and business. The other two measures capture regulatory qual-
ity and government e®ectiveness, respectively, and are taken from Kaufmann
et al. (2008). These are available for a wider range of countries than the eco-
nomic freedom index, but they have only been compiled since 1996. Although
institutions change only slowly, we concentrate on the economic freedom index
and only brie°y discuss results using the other two measures, where the 1996
values were used for earlier years.
Several other control variables are included. Income per capita in USD
(gdppc) controls for the possibility that richer and economically more devel-
oped countries may simply have higher energy production. The ratio of net
foreign direct investment in°ows to GDP (fdigdp) accounts for non-domestic
investment, including investment by foreign development banks. We would
13The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol arguably also marks a greater awareness of environ-
mental issues, which is not limited to industrialised countries. The level of \environmentalism"
may also contribute to the di®usion of RETs.
11generally expect this measure to positively a®ect RE sector development.14
The prices of the most common conventional fuels may a®ect investment
in alternative energy sources. We therefore control for the possible exogenous
e®ects on RE development of the costs of non-renewable energy resources pro-
duction by including the average annual market price of crude oil (oilprice),
coal (coalprice), and natural gas (natgasprice), as well as the respective per
capita production rates (oilprodpc, coalprodpc, and natgaspdopc). Furthermore,
an interaction term controls for the possibility that large fossil fuel producers
react di®erently to price changes than small producers or countries without any
fossil fuels at all. In fossil-fuel poor countries, we would expect a clear positive
e®ect of a fossil fuel price increase on the share of RE in power production.
Conversely, the more fossil fuels a country produces, the less likely it will be to
invest in alternative energy resources, particularly in times of high prices and
returns.
We also control for regional e®ects, as well as two speci¯c time e®ects in
the estimation period, namely the fall of the Soviet bloc and the start of the
economic (and political) transition of Central and Eastern European and Cen-
tral Asian countries, and the ¯nancial crisis of East Asia, Latin America and
Russia. We introduce a variable called transition for the former event, which
has value zero until 1991 and then increases with every year after transition for
transition countries, remaining zero for all others. This is meant to account for
the time-diminishing overall negative economic e®ect of the transition shock.
The variable ¯ncrisis captures the second event (common to all countries),
again assuming value zero until 1997, and then increasing with every successive
post-crisis year. Both time variables are expected to have a positive e®ect on
RE sector development, as investment in developing and transition countries
generally slumped after the shocks and then gradually picked up again.
Finally, we seek to control for actual RE potential by including two variables
for the two most important and widely di®used RETs. hydropot measures the
technically exploitable part of gross theoretical hydropower capability, in twh
per year. Where not available, gross theoretical capability was used instead.
The data was taken from the World Energy Council triannual Survey of En-
ergy Resources (WEC, various years); intermediate years were ¯lled in with the
latest available value. windpot measures the potential for the currently most
widely employed non-hydro RET, namely wind power. The measure is based on
a recent study by Archer and Jacobson (2005), who present the ¯rst attempt
at quantifying global wind power potential from real data. We construct a
dummy variable where zero equals poor or very poor potential, and one equals
14In further tests, we also consider o±cial development assistance by multilaterals, as well
as a variation including aid, to control for the speci¯c e®ect of multilateral donor money. This
variable proved insigni¯cant and is therefore not shown. Dummy variables for income groups
(classi¯ed according to the World Bank) were also not robust and did not change the main
results.
12moderate to high potential. According to the authors of the study, moderate
(economic) potential starts at wind speeds at 80m (the hub-height of modern,
77m-diameter, 1500 kw turbines) between 6.8 and 7.5 m/s. They ¯nd sub-
stantial potential in all regions, particularly in North America and (northern)
Europe, as well as the southern tip of South America.15 Although their study
is the ¯rst to calculate wind power potential with a consistent methodology
for the entire world, the data is available for one year only (generally 2000),
which may be problematic if wind patterns change over time, for example due
to e®ects of El Ni~ no.
The EIA renewable energy dataset contains several missing years due to
newly independent countries and gives us an unbalanced panel covering 119
non-OECD countries for the period from 1980 to 2006.16 Results including
OECD countries are also shown for comparison.
In our main estimations, we perform generalised least squares (GLS) regres-
sions for the equation
Yit = ®1 + ®2Fit + ®3Xit + !it; (1)
where Yit is the dependent variable (repc, hydropc or geopc) in country i at time
t, Fit denotes the ¯nancial sector development variable, and Xit the vector
of control variables. The composite error term !it consists of the country-
speci¯c error component ²i and the combined cross-section and time series error
component uit, according to !it = ²i + uit.17
The main estimations were performed with one-year-lags for all relevant
independent variables,18 since ¯nancial sector and other economic changes are
not expected to have immediate e®ects on electricity generation. Alternative
lag durations of up to ¯ve years con¯rm the results (available upon request), but
reduce the number of observations. As there is no clear theoretical indication
regarding the ideal lag number, we show results using one-year-lags.19
15Interestingly, their data shows that no wind-speed reporting station in mainland China
suggests moderate to high wind power potential. This runs counter to other studies focusing
on China, and to the increasing number of windfarms in China itself.
16Missing years in the dependent variables were not changed. Missing years in the explana-
tory variables appear to be random: up to two missing years were completed with simple linear
interpolation; larger holes in the data were left unaltered. Dummy variables for interpolated
years were insigni¯cant.
17See for example Baltagi (2008) or Hsiao (2003) for an extensive discussion of panel data
analysis models.
18Time-invariant measures, the Kyoto, transition and ¯nancial crisis variables were not
lagged.
19A further point worth considering is that ¯nancial sector development|our main variable
of interest|changes only slowly over time, which is an argument in favour of using one-year-
lags to maximise the number of observations. To test for possible cyclical e®ects, estimations
were also performed with ¯ve-year average values for the dependent variables, using beginning-
of-period values for the independent variables. The estimations consistently showed positive
13In further sensitivity tests that account for the possible dynamic e®ects of
RE sector development and test the causality, we perform a dynamic panel
data analysis. Linear dynamic panel analysis following Arellano and Bond
(1991) is also designed for panels where the cross-section dimension exceeds the
time dimension, as in our case where we have up to 119 non-OECD countries
and a maximum of 26 years. Dynamic models include unobserved country-level
e®ects, which by construction are correlated with the lagged dependent variable,
making standard estimators inconsistent. The Arellano and Bond (1991) ¯rst-
di®erenced Generalized Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimator is consistent for
the parameters of this model, though it still requires that there be no second-
order serial autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors, which we systematically
test for after two-step GMM estimations (not shown).
The basic estimation equation remains much the same as above (excluding
time-invariant regressors), with the addition of the lagged dependent variable
Yi(t¡1):
Yit = ¯0Yi(t¡1) + ¯1 + ¯2Fit + ¯3Xit + ºit: (2)
3 Estimation results
It is of particular interest to observe the sign and statistical validity of the
¯nancial sector coe±cients ®2 and ¯2. The aim is to observe whether the devel-
opment of the RE sector is|other things equal|positively in°uenced by the
¯nancial intermediary sector in general (captured by the broad ¯nancial depth
measure llgdp), and especially by the commercial banking system (proxied by
the commercial bank asset share dbacba and the private credit allocation pcrd-
bgdp). Controlling for variables which a®ect RE or ¯nancial sector development
allows us to draw conclusions on the causal impact of ¯nance on RETs.
3.1 Generalised Least Squares estimations
We begin by presenting random e®ects generalised least squares (GLS) estima-
tions according to equation (1) for our unbalanced panel of non-OECD coun-
tries.20 Table 2 shows results for a parsimonious, basic speci¯cation including
a ¯nancial sector variable, income per capita, FDI/GDP, the two energy sector
policy measures psreform and kyoto, and regional dummy variables. Columns
(1)-(3) give results with the total RE produced per capita (repc), while columns
e®ects of ¯nancial intermediation on RE sector development, but the impact was seldom
signi¯cant. Moreover, the reduced number of observations generally led to lower statistical
quality of the estimations.
20Hausman speci¯cation tests consistently showed no advantage of using ¯xed-e®ects es-
timations, and we therefore show only random-e®ects results. See Baltagi (2008) for more
details on the Hausman speci¯cation test.
14(4)-(6) show results for hydroelectric power (hydropc), and columns (7)-(9) for
non-hydro power generation (geopc).
First of all, it is striking that all three ¯nancial sector development measures
have the expected positive sign in all but the very last speci¯cation, and are
moreover mostly signi¯cant. As far as the magnitude of the e®ects is concerned,
in terms of beta coe±cients we see for example from column (1) that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the commercial bank asset share would|other
things equal|lead to a small increase of 0.03 standard deviations in the RE per
capita produced ((0:23¤0:087)=0:78). The e®ects on the overall RE generation
per capita are slightly smaller in magnitude for the other two measures of
¯nancial sector development, weighing in at around 0.02 in both cases. The
e®ects are similarly minimal when we consider only hydro power, with beta
coe±cients again around 0.02. However, the e®ect of ¯nancial intermediation
appears to be much more substantial when we consider only non-hydro RE:
a one-standard-deviation increase in the commercial bank asset share leads
to an increase in geopc by 0.184 of a standard deviation (using results from
column (7)). The large negative e®ect of \¯nancial depth" in the last column
is puzzling: it appears that ¯nancial sector development in general diminishes
RET use, while commercial banking increases it. However, this e®ect is not
robust to dropping outliers (see below).
Regarding the other covariates in Table 2, we ¯nd on the one hand that
power sector reforms have a counter-intuitive e®ect on RE generation: the co-
e±cient has a negative sign in all but the estimations using non-hydro RE.
Note however that in robustness tests including a dummy variable for countries
that were \arti¯cially" assigned a top score of six for power sector reforms,
or alternatively dropped from the estimations, the signi¯cance on the negative
coe±cients disappeared, while the positive coe±cients became signi¯cant (re-
sults available upon request). On the other hand, the results show consistently
strong positive e®ects of the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, suggesting that
the connected emission-reduction policies (or possibly the greater environmen-
tal awareness linked to the widespread discussion of the Protocol) have led to
greater RET di®usion.
Per capita income has the expected positive sign and is often highly signi¯-
cant, con¯rming that richer countries also produce more energy. The FDI shares
of GDP however have no consistent sign, being positive and highly signi¯cant
in columns (1) and (4), and negative and insigni¯cant otherwise. Finally, there
appear to be signi¯cant di®erences in Middle Eastern and North African coun-
tries (mena), which include most OPEC countries, and sub-Saharan African
countries (ssa): both regions have lower RE electricity generation on average
than other non-OECD countries. Non-hydro RE use is signi¯cantly lower espe-
cially in sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and Central Asia (eca), in the latter
case probably due to Soviet-era policies.
15The ¯rst results are encouraging, but still leave room for some omitted vari-
able bias: the explanatory power given by the R-squareds, though not unusually
low for such a large and varied sample of countries, is modest. In Table 3, we
therefore consider additional variables. We control for overall institutional qual-
ity (econfree) and the e®ects of oil production and prices. For space reasons,
we concentrate on the two narrower ¯nancial sector variables dbacba (Panel A)
and pcrdbgdp (Panel B) and do not show results for hydropc (which are very
similar to those for repc), as well as for the control variables income per capita,
FDI/GDP, and the regional dummies.
Panel A shows that commercial banking (dbacba) continues to have a strong
positive e®ect on RE use. The coe±cients in columns (1)-(3) for all types of
RETs remain in the same order of magnitude as in Table 2; however, the
coe±cients in columns (4)-(6) increase remarkably, with beta coe±cients for
a one-standard-deviation change in commercial banking development of 0.29.
This indicates that this particular area of the ¯nancial sector can have a real
impact on the adoption of non-hydro RETs, even once we take into account
the policy and institutional environment. The same can however not be said
for credit to the private sector (pcrdbgdp) in Panel B, which is not robust to
controlling for institutional quality (econfree) and oil production and prices.21
The measure of economic freedom (econfree) has the expected positive sign
and is mostly signi¯cant, especially in Panel B, indicating that a stable insti-
tutional framework positively a®ects investments in the RE power sector. Oil
production and oil prices seem to have most impact on the use of non-hydro
RETs (columns (4)-(6)): oil producers have less electricity generated with wind,
solar, geothermal and other non-hydro RE. An oil price increase, on the other
hand, makes investment in these RETs more worthwhile, indicated by the pos-
itive sign. However, the interaction term oilprodpc ¤ oilprice shows that this
\substitution e®ect" away from conventional fossil fuels to RETs is less pro-
nounced in oil-producing countries and may even be completely cancelled out.
For example, at the sample mean oil production of 0.04 barrels per day and per
capita, an oil price increase of one standard deviation (11.31 USD per barrel)
would|other things equal|lead to an increase in the non-hydro RE use in elec-
tricity generation of 0.034 standard deviations: a negligible e®ect.22 However,
the same price increase in the relatively largest oil producer (Qatar, with 2.11
barrels per day and per capita) would hypothetically lead to a massive decrease
in the use of non-hydro RE of over one standard deviation.
Table A of the Appendix shows results using coal and natural gas. The
pattern for natural gas (Panel B) is similar to that for oil, while the e®ects
of coal price increases are consistent across all countries, coal producers and
21In additional estimations with the institutional quality measures compiled by Kaufman
et al. (2008), pcrdbgdp proves signi¯cant at the 5%-level for repc and hydropc, but not geopc.
Results available upon request.
22Using results in Panel A: (0:04 ¤ 11:31 ¤ ¡0:001) + (11:31 ¤ 0:0001)).
16otherwise (Panel A). This suggests that (major) oil and natural gas producers
generally have lower levels of RE use, probably re°ecting di®erent investment
incentives.
In additional estimations shown in the Appendix (Table B), we found that
the economic transition of former East Bloc countries had a weakly signi¯cant
impact on RE generation: power production with all types of renewable en-
ergy has increased steadily since the transition shock. The ¯nancial markets
shock of 1997-1998 however had no strong impact on overall RE production
in developing and transition countries; but non-hydro RET use has increased
signi¯cantly since the ¯nancial crisis of the late 1990s. Note however that this
positive impact may be combined with a post-Kyoto e®ect, since the time pe-
riods coincide: in fact, the simple Kyoto dummy variable|which is otherwise
consistently highly signi¯cant|loses its strength here. Our measures of RE
potential prove inconclusive: both have positive signs, but neither approaches
conventional levels of signi¯cance.
Finally, we compare di®erent samples in Table C, starting with the entire
world in Panel A. Credit to the private sector (pcrdbgdp) is the only signi¯cantly
positive ¯nancial sector variable, while ¯nancial depth (llgdp) once again shows
a signi¯cant negative impact on non-hydro RE use. Note that the e®ect of
(pcrdbgdp) is much higher than we saw previously for non-OECD countries,
and strongly signi¯cant for all types of RE, while at the same time ¯nancial
depth (llgdp) shows an increased negative e®ect on geopc.
Interestingly, there appears to be no consistent post-Kyoto e®ect in the
entire world sample: this may point to policies on RE which were already being
enforced prior to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. For example, according to
the World Energy Council's Survey of Energy Resources of 1998, many OECD
countries were already close to realising their technically exploitable hydropower
capacity at the time. They were probably farther away from their capacity
frontiers as regards non-hydro RETs; the Kyoto dummy is marginally signi¯cant
in column (9), indicating the possibility of positive e®ects of the commitments
undertaken within the Kyoto Protocol. However, the e®ect is too weak to draw
any more de¯nite conclusions.
Panel B includes only low- to upper-middle-income non-OECD countries
(no high-income): the main e®ects from Tables 2-3 are con¯rmed, and the
explanatory power increases substantially. Panel C shows results for non-OECD
countries without outliers Paraguay (as regards overall RE and hydro electricity
generation) and Costa Rica (for non-hydro production), which again con¯rm
the main results. Overall, the positive impact of ¯nancial sector development on
RE, and especially non-hydro electricity generation, seems remarkably robust.
Note that the negative e®ect of llgdp on geopc appears to be driven by the
outlier Costa Rica, as it disappears when we drop that country.
173.2 Dynamic panel data estimations
The results of the panel estimations shown above are very suggestive of a robust
impact of ¯nancial sector development|especially commercial bank asset share
and private credit share|on RE production in non-OECD countries. How-
ever, the explanatory power of the speci¯cations is generally between 9-20%
of the overall sample variation, indicating some possible omitted variable bias;
moreover, energy sector development may display a dynamic development over
time. In order to address these points and also con¯rm the causal relationship,
we perform dynamic one-step Generalised Method-of-Moments (GMM) estima-
tions after Arellano and Bond (1991).23 Table 4 presents the results of the basic
regressions using equation (2). The highly signi¯cant lagged dependent vari-
ables suggest that a dynamic approach is justi¯ed. Beyond this, we note that
the results from the dynamic estimations con¯rm the positive and signi¯cant
e®ect of ¯nancial sector development on RE production. A post-Kyoto (policy)
e®ect is noticeable only for non-hydro RETs, shown in columns (7)-(9). The
magnitudes of the single impacts remain similar to those seen above with GLS:
they are slightly higher for repc and hydropc, and slightly lower for geopc.
In Table 5, we show results with additional variables econfree and oil pro-
duction and prices, similar to Table 3. For space reasons, we concentrate on
commercial banking (dbacba), which again proves the most robust ¯nancial
sector variable, particularly as regards geopc. Note that the coe±cients for
the commercial banking share now approach the magnitudes seen in Table 2
above. However, the oil variables no longer appear to have any impact, and in
some cases even change signs. There is also no longer any observable \Kyoto
e®ect" on RET use in electricity production. Overall, the results for the dy-
namic GMM estimations prove weaker than for GLS, although ¯nancial sector
development|in particular the commercial banking share|still has signi¯cant
positive impacts on RE use.
In sum, the results of the empirical analysis support the idea that ¯nan-
cial intermediary development encourages the growth of the RE sector. How-
ever, the e®ect is quite small in magnitude when we consider the beta coe±-
cients: only for the case of non-hydro RE is the impact economically important
throughout the speci¯cations. Moreover, not all ¯nancial measures are equally
important: commercial banking seems to deliver the best support for the real-
isation of RE projects. As regards policy, we ¯nd an ambiguous impact of the
power sector reform index; it is di±cult to explain this, as unfortunately it is
a time-invariant index and does not speci¯cally examine RE policies, but looks
at how level the playing ¯eld is for all types of resources and producers. The
more RE-relevant Kyoto dummy however shows that there has been a clear
23Tests performed after two-step GMM estimations with the same speci¯cations show that
the overidentifying restrictions are valid, and that there is no indication of second-order au-
tocorrelation.
18positive development in RET use in transition and developing countries since
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in late 1997. This may be due to the grow-
ing number of CDM projects, or to a growing environmental awareness with
domestic RE policies, or both. Finally, the ¯ndings are robust to the inclusion
of other covariates which could in°uence RE sector development, and to various
di®erent sample sizes.
4 Discussion and conclusions
This paper examines the e®ects of ¯nancial intermediation on the development
of the renewable energy (RE) sector in a series of panel data estimations for the
period 1980-2006. Energy production today relies on exhaustible and polluting
conventional fossil fuels, and a larger share of alternative energy sources in
primary energy production would not only have positive environmental e®ects,
but would also bring greater energy security for future generations, as RETs
exploit domestic renewable energy resources. The increased use of RETs is
one of the instruments to achieve the emission-reduction goals of the Kyoto
Protocol, and it is also mentioned for example by the UN as a crucial part of
achieving sustainable development.
The focus is on non-OECD developing and transition countries. Energy
¯rms in less developed economies are largely dependent on external ¯nancing
to realise new projects; in turn, external ¯nancing in these countries relies on
the banking sector, as stock and bond markets, as well as venture capitalism, are
not well enough established to provide large-scale funding. However, the under-
development of the banking sector, in addition to speci¯c RE-sector problems
such as high up-front and information costs and long lead times, hamper the
emergence of RE entrepreneurs. The ¯nancing problems are combined with the
greater issue of energy sector regulations and RET policies, which do not always
o®er a level playing ¯eld for all energy producers, as fossil fuel generation often
bene¯ts from special incentives, as well as the advantage of well-established
technologies and hence fewer unknowns for potential investors.
The empirical estimations, using RE electricity generation per capita as a
proxy for RE sector development, show that ¯nancial sector development does
indeed have a robust and signi¯cant positive e®ect on the amount of renewable
energy produced, which is independent of (or in addition to) energy policy. We
found that the e®ect is particularly large when we consider non-hydropower RE
(i.e., geothermal, solar, wind, wood and waste), where a one-standard-deviation
increase in our ¯nancial intermediation measures leads to an increase in non-
hydro RE of up to 0.3 of a standard deviation. Of the three ¯nancial sector
measures used, the commercial bank asset share and the private credit share
proved the most robust, while ¯nancial depth is probably too broad a measure
to adequately capture the more bank-focused development that is assumed to
19be important in developing and emerging economies. The results are robust to
controlling for additional e®ects and to di®erent sample speci¯cations.
The ¯ndings also suggest that there has been a strong positive post-Kyoto
e®ect in RET use in non-OECD countries, though we cannot pinpoint the exact
cause to either the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms such as CDM and JI, or a grow-
ing environmental awareness with consequent domestic RE policies. The power
sector reforms indicator had an ambiguous impact on RE sector development:
the e®ect on overall RE use and hydropower tended to be negative, while the in-
°uence on non-hydro RETs was more positive. The lack of a clearer conclusion
in this regard may be due to the data: the power sector reform index provided
by ESMAP (1999) is available for only one year (1998), and concentrates on
evaluating competitiveness and creating a level playing ¯eld for all types of en-
ergy resources, with no particular focus on RETs. Moreover, the mixed reform
results to date in non-OECD countries have led to a general rethinking of the
objectives and underlying assumptions of power sector reform (e.g., Williams
and Ghanadan, 2006), which will hopefully lead to more adequate measures
(and incentives) of reform progress.
As regards possible di®erences in fossil fuel producing countries, there is
indeed some indication that (major) oil and natural gas producers generally see
less electricity generation with RETs, particularly non-hydro RE, than other
countries. Fossil fuel price increases likely weaken the incentives to invest in
RETs in major producers, while their e®ect is opposite in smaller producers
and fossil fuel-poor countries.
The approach o®ers a ¯rst attempt at empirically verifying the role of ¯nance
for the development of the renewable energy industry. The availability of quality
data on RE development and investment has so far hampered empirical studies
in this area; further work is needed to corroborate the results, especially in
the form of case studies. Additionally, it will be interesting to see the future
impacts and developments of the Kyoto Protocol.
Any policy recommendations must remain tentative at this point. Neverthe-
less, it seems safe to say that the ¯nancial sector does indeed have a measurable
impact on the emergence of renewable energy producers. A regulatory frame-
work aimed at fostering the RE sector cannot neglect the ¯nancing aspects, and
particularly the availability of private sector ¯nancial intermediation. Develop-
ing and strengthening the ¯nancial sector of course has greater macroeconomic
bene¯ts, as demonstrated by the vast ¯nance-and-growth literature; however,
it also has a non-negligible in°uence on the success of RE, especially the most
recent non-hydro RETs.
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24Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Shown for non-OECD countries from 1980-2006
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
repc 3911 0.31 0.78 0.00 10.03
hydropc 3911 0.30 0.78 0.00 10.03
geopc 3911 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.34
dbacba 3321 0.74 0.23 -0.11 1.34
pcrdbgdp 2901 0.27 0.23 0.00 1.66
llgdp 2914 0.41 0.27 0.00 1.57
psreform 3564 2.58 2.37 0.00 6.00
econfree 2446 5.5 1.1 2.1 8.79
gdppc 3566 4946.10 7064.55 111.76 70715.84
fdigdp 3380 3.30 9.22 -82.89 348.19
oilprodpc 3967 0.04 0.17 0.00 2.11
oilprice 4212 24.27 11.31 12.21 61.50
hydropot 3022 93.25 262.13 0 2474















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 3: Robustness analysis with additional regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
repc repc repc geopc geopc geopc
Panel A
dbacba 0.086** 0.086** 0.087** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(2.34) (2.34) (2.37) (6.07) (6.09) (5.99)
psreform -0.102** ¡0:101¤¤ -0.101** 0:001 0.001 0.001
(2.00) (1.97) (1.98) (0.54) (0.73) (0.73)
kyoto 0.022** 0.022** 0.023** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(2.05) (2.04) (2.12) (3.74) (3.60) (3.31)
econfree 0.013* 0.013* 0.014* 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.81) (1.81) (1.84) (1.39) (1.22) (0.98)
oilprodpc ¡0:081 ¡0:057 ¡0:043¤¤ ¡0:026





Observations 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829
Countries 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 within 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.10
R2 between 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.06
R2 overall 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
Panel B
pcrdbgdp 0.053 0.0538 0.05 ¡0:004 -0.005 -0.005
(1.28) (1.29) (1.18) (0.80) (1.01) (1.03)
psreform -0.105** -0.105** -0.105** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.96) (1.96) (1.97) (0.85) (1.05) (1.07)
kyoto 0.027** 0.027** 0.0294*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(2.49) (2.49) (2.68) (3.90) (3.79) (3.42)
econfree 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(2.83) (2.82) (2.99) (4.10) (4.08) (3.80)
oilprodpc 0.046 0.058 -0.036* ¡0:019





Observations 1756 1756 1756 1756 1756 1756
Counries 89 89 89 89 89 89
R2 within 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07
R2 between 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.16
R2 overall 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12
Notes: All regressions are random-e®ects GLS on sample panel of non-OECD countries, with
1-year-lags for all indicators except (psreform), kyoto, and the regional dummies (not shown).







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All data were collected for non-OECD countries (as of 1980|the recent OECD members Czech
Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, and Slovakia were included in the estimations)
and for OECD countries for comparison, for the years 1980-2006 (where available).
Variable De¯nition Source
repc Net total renewable resource electric power generation in
billion kwh per capita|including hydro, wood and waste,
geothermal, solar, and wind.
Own calculation
from EIA (2006)




geopc Net non-hydro renewable resource electric power gener-
ation in billion kwh per capita|including geothermal,
wind, solar, and wood and waste.
Own calculation
from EIA (2006)
dbacba Deposit money bank assets / (deposit money + central)
bank assets (i.e., commercial bank asset share versus
Central Bank).
Beck et al. (2000)
pcrdbgdp Private credit by deposit money banks / GDP. Beck et al. (2000)
llgdp Liquid Liabilities / GDP (¯nancial depth). Beck et al. (2000)
psreform Qualitative power sector reform indicator for 1998, rang-
ing from 0 (no reforms) to 6 (all relevant reforms imple-
mented in all areas). All OECD and other high-income
countries not included in the original study were assigned
a value of 6.
ESMAP (1999)
kyoto Dummy variable taking value one from 1998 onwards
(post-Kyoto Protocol period).
Own construction
gdppc GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) in current USD. WDI
econfree Economic freedom summary index. Gwartney et al.
(2008)
fdigdp Foreign direct investment net in°ows (%GDP). WDI
oilprodpc Per capita oil production in barrels per day. Own calculation
from EIA (2006)
oilprice Crude oil prices measured in USD per barrel, in current
dollars.
British Petroleum
natgasprodpc Per capita Natural gas production in btu equivalents. British Petroleum
natgasprice Natural gas price in USD per million btu, in current dol-
lars.
British Petroleum
coalprodpc Per capita coal production in million tonnes. British Petroleum.
coalprice Coal price in USD per tonne, in current dollars. British Petroleum
transition Measure for transition shock in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope as well as former Soviet countries. Years until 1991
have value zero, and post-transition years take on in-
creasing values. All other countries receive value zero
throughout the period.
Own construction
¯ncrisis Financial crisis measure, taking value zero until 1997,
then increasing with every post-crisis year.
Own construction
eca Dummy variable for countries of Europe and Central
Asia.
mena Dummy variable for countries of the Middle East and
Northern Africa.
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